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ANOTHER NAIL IN THE COFFIN OF THE SMALL
INVESTOR: THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM ACT OF 19951
James Cotton2
I. INTRODUCTION
How does a small investor3 in the stock market determine
whether or not fraud has been committed by the management of a
company where his money is invested? How can he find out if
his company is being defrauded by its own management? How
can he hold corporate management accountable for fraudulent
actions? This article will examine the information and remedies
that the small investor has a right to under federal and state laws.
First, an investor is entitled to receive information in the
form of an annual corporate report.4 The annual report, which is
certified by the corporation's auditors, gives the investor a
financial picture of the company at the very instant the report is
' Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k,771, 77z-
1, 77z-2, 78a, 78j-1, 78t, 78u, 78u-4, 78u-5; and a 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1995)).
2 Mr. Cotton retired from the International Business Machines ("IBM")
Corporation Law Department in 1995. During his 25-year career in IBM he
practiced Securities, Anti-Trust, Real Estate, and General Corporate Law.
Currently, he is an Associate Professor of Law at Texas Southern Universities
Thurgood Marshall School of Law.
3 For purposes of this article the definition of small investor shall be anyone
who owns securities valued at less than $10,000. Investors with less than
$10,000 account for nearly 43.4% of all stockowners. See NEw YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE, STOCKOWNERSHIP 1995 (1995).
4 An annual report describing the financial condition of the corporation is
required by almost all state statutes. See ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §
16.20(a)(1994), which provides:
A corporation shall furnish its shareholders annual financial
statements, which may be consolidated or combined
statements of the corporation and one or more of its
subsidiaries, as appropriate, that include a balance sheet as of
the end of the fiscal year, an income statement for that year,
and a statement of changes in shareholder's equity for the
year unless that information appears elsewhere in the
financial statements records.
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finished, typically December 31st each year. Thus, the annual
report is out of date the day after it is published, and it continues
to become outdated as it ages. To keep the annual report
updated, the small investor may receive quarterly periodic reports
pursuant to the federal securities laws.
The annual report is a document that can be read by most
sophisticated investors. However, it is almost impossible to
detect fraudulent activity in the company based on reading the
annual report. Instead, the annual report is generally a sales
document designed to demonstrate to investors how well
management is managing the corporation. The annual report that
goes to the shareholder typically has all of the required financial
information. However, the report will customarily have at least
twice as much space devoted to attractive pictures and text to give
the appearance of success even if the numbers disprove such sales
hype. 6 For the most part, professional investors are the prime
users of these reports. The annual corporate report is clearly not
a document upon which to base a claim of fraud or deceit.
Actionable fraud and/or misrepresentation is more likely to be
discovered in the working documents which support these
reports. Misrepresentations, such as over or under estimations
and unrealistic assumptions, are not easily detected in an annual
report. The existence of fraud and the intent in making such
exaggerations may only be discerned after substantial litigation
discovery proceedings.
In addition to annual reports, a stockholder has a right to
review the books and records of his company pursuant to the laws
of the state of incorporation provided he does so "in good faith,
' See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a), The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13a. The
13(a) reports consist of the 10-K Annual Report, 10-Q Quarterly Report, and
the 8-K Current Report. These reports are filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and, where appropriate, the securities exchanges.
6 See JAMEs D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEvOORT,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS, 701 (1991).
' See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1992). To bring a claim for fraud or deceit
under lOb-5, a plaintiff must prove the following five elements: (1) fraud or
deceit (2) by any person (3) in connection with (4) the purchase or sale (5)
of any security.
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and for a proper purpose."S The question of what is a "proper
purpose" is a matter of law for the court to decide. 9 Examples of
a proper purpose might be to ascertain the financial condition of
the corporation, the existence of mismanagement, or to attain the
names and addresses of other shareholders in order to
communicate with them concerning corporate affairs.' 0 Typical
improper purposes could be to learn business secrets to aid a
competitor of the corporation, for the purposes of blackmail and
extortion, or to pursue one's own social or political goals." One
can imagine the cooperation that can be expected of corporate
management if the stated purpose for reviewing the books and
records is to determine what fraud and misrepresentation
management has engaged in over the last year or so. As one
would expect, a request for books and records is not generally
welcomed by corporate management. 2
Another shortcoming of the right to review the books and
records is that it does not produce information that will be
available at the time the pleadings are drafted. For example,
suppose a product is prematurely released with known problems,
and destined to become a failure. When the product fails, the
information about how and why will most likely be buried in the
bowels of the corporation and can only be uncovered with great
difficulty. Although a review of the books and records may
reveal some fraudulent activity on the part of the company's
product assurance department, thereby making the request to
review a proper purpose, the information revealed from the
examination will not be available at the time the pleadings are
drafted. This makes the stockholder susceptible to a motion to
dismiss.
The stockholder may also attend the annual meeting of
stockholders to learn more about his company and its
8 See, e.g., ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 16.02(c)(1).
9 See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS,
536-37 (Student Edition 1983).
1o Id.
" Id. at 538.
12 Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years'
Experience, 4 COLUM. J. OF LAW & Soc. PROBLEMS 50, 64 (1968).
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management.' 3 However, it is highly unlikely that there will be
any evidence of improper business practices or fraudulent activity
discussed by the chairman of the board as he conducts the annual
meeting of stockholders. Annual meetings are usually conducted
in a manner designed to impress investors with the chairman and
his team's skill in running the corporation. As the annual
meeting is usually carefully scripted, nothing is going to be said
or done that will be legally actionable by a stockholder. It goes
without saying that the small investor is never invited to financial
analysts' intimate briefings, where hard questions may be asked
and followed up on to determine the accuracy and the veracity of
the corporate management's answers.
Finally, the stockholder may watch the movement of his
stock on the stock exchanges, and when there is a significant
(10%) fall in the value of the stock, the stockholder may request
an explanation. If the explanation provided by the corporation is
unsatisfactory, the stockholder will have standing to bring a
derivative lawsuit on behalf of the company against
management. 14
Although the above list is the extent of the stockholder's
right to information concerning his corporation, one concept has
yet to be mentioned: the "Wall Street Rule". The Wall Street
Rule states that if you do not like the company or its
management, sell. This may seem to be the best form of
protection available to all stockholders, 15 but does this work for
the small investor or is this an avenue of relief reserved for the
more sophisticated or institutional investor? The answer to that
question is that the Wall Street Rule is for Wall Street, not for the
small investor. The small investor is simply not equipped
financially, or information-wise, to buy and sell stock based on
information available over the Dow Jones or other stock
13 Corporations are usually required to hold annual shareholder meetings.
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 600(b)(West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
211(b)(2001); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 602(b)(McKinney's 1986 & Supp.
2002); ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.01.
'4 See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.
15 See Scott F. Norberg, Debtor Incentives, Agency Costs, and Voting Theory
in Chapter 11, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 507, 516 (1998).
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information services. A small investor, almost by definition,
does not watch the Dow Jones on a daily basis. Moreover, the
small investor is more committed emotionally to his portfolio than
the professional investor. The small investor is often not equipped
to use the tools he or she does have to hold corporate
management accountable. As a result, the Wall Street Rule does
not compensate for the deficiencies in the information methods
discussed above. To say the least, it is not an effective tool for
the small investor.
It is therefore clear that despite all of the disclosure that is
available to stockholders today, much of the disclosure will not
reveal the existence of a scheme to defraud, particularly where
corporate management may be involved in the scheme. Fraud is
not easy to discover. By definition, fraud involves deceit, 16 which
means it is not going to be self-evident in any SEC filing by a
publicly held corporation. Not only is fraud difficult to discover,
it becomes more difficult when the allegations are against a
corporation of some reputation.
1 7
Given the sources of information and methods of verifying
the performance of a corporation that are available to the small
investor, the only real tools and remedies available for a
stockholder to hold management accountable are stockholder
derivative lawsuits 18 and stockholder proposals. 19 However, the
usefulness of these tools has been diminished by a range of
restrictions imposed by assorted regulations, rules, and statutes.
The small investor has been curtailed in his ability to
influence management through stockholder proposals by
minimum ownership and holding requirements that were
established by the SEC.20 In addition, The derivative suit has
been under attack for a long time by corporate management as the
16 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990)(describing fraud as
"[a] false representation... which deceives and is intended to deceive another
17 See Dirks v. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
1s See infra parts III and liA, discussing the derivative lawsuit and the effect
of the Security for Expense Statute on the derivative lawsuit.
19 See infra part IV, discussing stockholder proposals.
20 See infra part IV, discussing stockholder proposals.
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source of "frivolous lawsuits. " 21 As a result, the usefulness of
the derivative lawsuit has diminished as the small investor has
been curtailed in his ability to require corporate accounting by
"security-for-expense" statutes that have been adopted in various
jurisdictions.22 In addition, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has been amended to the point of discouraging the
small investor from litigating. 23
Moreover, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
241995 (PSLRA), which is another effort to stop frivolous
lawsuits, has had the effect of further limiting the rights of the
small investor. 25 As a result of the PSLRA, the small investor no
longer has the right to act as a "private attorney general." Fifty-
five years ago, Judge Jerome Frank coined the term "private
attorney general" as a means of recognizing the role of private
litigation in the enforcement of securities laws.26 Judge Frank
explicitly recognized that Congress can confer standing on private
persons, not simply to recover compensation for specific victims,
but also "to vindicate the public interest." 27 The United States
Supreme Court also recognized the importance of the private
attorney general concept. 28 The Court made the assumption that
private enforcement would multiply the resources available in
preventing fraud in the securities market. 29  The theory of the
21 Charles M. Yablon, The Good, The Bad, and The Frivolous Case: An
Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REv. 65, 66 (1996).
22 See infra part liA, discussing the effect of the Security for Expense
Statute on the derivative lawsuit.
23 See infra part IIIB, discussing the effect of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 on the derivative lawsuit.
24 Pub. L. No. 104-67, see also supra note 1.
25 See infra part V, discussing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995.
26 See Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694,
704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) (stating that "such
persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.")
27 Id.
28 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (reasoning that
"private enforcement ... provides a necessary supplement" to public law
enforcement, and the Court therefore implied private causes of actions under
federal securities laws).
29 Id.
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private attorney general emphasizes that the rule of private
litigation is not merely to secure compensation for victims, but it
should also deter fraud, by multiplying the total resources
committed to detection and prosecution of crime and fraud.30
It is the thesis of this article that the small investor in the
American corporation has been the victim of the rule of
unintended consequences. 31 The small investor has steadily and
regularly been assaulted by corporate management in efforts
which have reduced the investor's ability to make management
accountable for its performance. Not only does the small investor
face the hurdles discussed above in obtaining information relating
to potential fraud and misrepresentation by corporate
management, the increased perception that derivative lawsuits are
frivolous in nature has resulted in further limitations being placed
upon the rights of the small investor. Small investors and, quite
possibly, all stockholders are steadily losing power to keep the
corporate management accountable and liable for questionable
actions.
II. CORPORATE DEMOCRACY AND CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY
The concept of groups being formed for various purposes
with governmental approval goes back to ancient Roman times.32
There are certain themes that recur in the development of the
corporate concept such as group action, approval of the
sovereign, and a purpose.33 It is probable that some form of
corporate democracy may have existed at common law because
many business associations at that time had both ownership and
30 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the
Model of the Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215 (1983).
31 The rule of unintended consequences is that well known rule of
conventional wisdom that says that things do not always turn out the way we
intend them to.
32 HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 14, provides a good discussion of
the ancient origins of the corporate concept.
33 Id. at 14-15.
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control in a very few people.34 Common principles of today's
business corporation, such as limited liability, developed more or
less as afterthoughts. 35
In all of the history and even in current incorporation
statutes it is rare to find a comprehensive definition of a business
corporation.36 One of the better definitions is that "the business
corporation is a type of a corporation formed to collect a fund of
capital and to dedicate such fund to a more or less definite
business purpose for profit." 37  Based on this definition, an
essential part of the corporate concept is the collection of funds
from people and the management of those funds by others.38
Shareholders are the owners from whom the funds are collected.
The directors are the managers of the corporate entity, who work
on behalf of the shareholders and manage the funds gathered on
behalf of the corporation. 39 This split between ownership and
management has given rise to the idea of "corporate
democracy. "40
The term "corporate democracy" has come to mean a
method for governing a corporation. 41 In the model for corporate
governance, stockholders, because of their investment, "own"
the corporation. The shareholders have the duty of electing the
board of directors, which, in turn, has the legal obligation to
manage the affairs of the corporation. The board then acts
through officers and managers to put into effect its policies.42 The
conventional corporation, theoretically, resembles a democratic
34 id.
35 id. at 19.
6 Id. at 2, n.3.
37 Id.
38 HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 491.
39 Id.
40 See, e.g., Mortimer M. Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings and Corporate
Democracy: The Lawyer's Role, 37 VA. L. REv. 653 (1951).
41 id.
42 Leila N. Sadat-Keeling, The 1983 Amendments to Shareholder Proposal
Rule 14A-8: A Retreat From Corporate Democracy, 59 TUL. L. REv. 161,
162.
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institution in which decisions are made and leaders chosen
according to a democratic one-vote for one-share scheme.
43
Americans have historically distrusted the corporate form
of doing business. 44 Alexis de Tocqueville, in his treatise on
Democracy in America, made the following observation in a
discussion about "companies:"
It must be admitted that these collective beings, which are
called companies, are stronger and more formidable than a
private individual can ever be, and that they have less of
the responsibility for their own actions; whence it seems
reasonable that they should not be allowed to retain so
great an independence of the supreme government as
might be conceded to a private individual. The power and
duration of these small private bodies in the midst of
weakness and instability of the whole community astonish
and alarm the people, and the free use which each
association makes of its natural powers is almost regarded
as a dangerous privilege.45
Corporate democracy became a major topic in corporate
America in the 1980s in the form of the proposed statutes: the
Federal Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980,46 and the
43 Id.
" Id. See also HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 16 (discussing how
Americans have distrusted corporations as early as 1770, when Adam Smith
expressed his views against concentrations of business; and Blackstone
provided brief commentaries on corporations).
45 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 311-12 (Alfred A.
Knopf 1960).
4See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 34, n.49. (The proposed
Federal Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, S.2567, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (Apr. 16, 1980), would have defined the directors' duty of loyalty
and duty of due care, required that a majority of the board of directors be
independent, and that there be independent audit and nominating committees.
Provision was made for shareholder nominations of directors and cumulative
'voting. Jurisdiction to enforce the Act would have been concurrent in the
federal and state courts, with broad venue and possible allowance of litigation
expenses to any prevailing party).
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proposed Federal Corporate Democracy Act of 1980. 47  In
addition to these statutes, the American Law Institute's ("ALl")
Principles of Corporate Governance also fostered the maturation
of the corporate democracy concept.48 The ALl Principles of
Corporate Governance recommend that corporations should seek
to conduct business in a way that will make maximum profits for
shareholders. 49 The Corporate Governance Principles go on to
suggest that a corporation, just like a natural person should only
act within the law. 5° Thus, in accordance with these principles,
and in its most current and modern form, the purpose of the
corporation is to lawfully make profits for all of its shareholders,
including the small investor in the corporation.
The basic corporate law of most states provides that
shareholders elect the directors who manage their corporations
5
'
and vote to approve fundamental corporate transactions.52 Thus,
(in principle) the stockholders actually control the corporation.
Indeed, the management of a modern day corporation would be
impossible without the ability to solicit proxies from the
shareholders of the corporation.5 3 This is particularly true in the
case of multi-national corporations, where shareholders are
47 Id. (The proposed Federal Corporate Democracy Act of 1980 would have
required that the majority of the directors be independent, defined the
director's duty of loyalty and duty of due care, required independent
supervisory and public policy committees. Shareholder nomination of
directors and cumulative voting were mandated. Broad disclosure was
specified and abusive discharge would have been prohibited).
48 A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCrURE:
RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1994).
49 Id.
o Id.
5' See, e.g., CAL. CORP CODE § 301 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
21 l(b)(2001); ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.28.
52 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2001) (stockholder voting
requirements for merger or consolidation of domestic corporations); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 803 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 2002)(amendments to
articles of incorporation). For a broad discussion of what constitutes
fundamental corporate transactions subject to shareholder approval, also see
HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 951-1018.
53 HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 951-1018.
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located worldwide. Solicitation of proxies is essential in these
corporations in order to be able to ratify the actions of
directors.4
Acting as managers of the corporation, the board of
directors will solicit proxies, for various reasons (elections,
ratifications, etc.), from shareholders. If the management gets
more than 50% of outstanding proxies, the board can then use the
proxies to elect themselves and/or to approve any of their
previous actions on behalf of the corporation.55 The importance
of proxy solicitation and shareholder voting is much less than
may be expected because the process is completely controlled by
the directors as managers of the corporation. 56 Directors are
working on "behalf' of shareholders to ratify director
decisions. s
Although proxy solicitations are generally controlled by
management, in accordance with the corporate democracy
concept, the law allows a stockholder to have some input as to
what information can be included in a proxy solicitation.
Specifically, in 1942, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") enacted SEC Rule 14a-8, which required corporate
management to include proposals from shareholders in the
corporation's proxy solicitation material whenever it was legally
necessary for management to solicit proxies from shareholders .s
The stockholder proposal rule seems to provide stockholders with
an avenue for retaining some control over the directors who
"technically" work for them. 59  As will be discussed later,
however, the stockholder proposal rule, like so many other
stockholder tools provided to the small investor, does not fully
carry out the intention of the corporate democracy concept.
The idea of corporate democracy and its supposed benefit
to the stockholder has received some criticism even though it
s4 Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional, Shareholder Proposals, and
Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REv. 97 (1998).
ss Id.
56 Id.
57 HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 570.
58 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
s9 See infra part IV, discussing stockholder proposals.
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seems fair and practical. Since ownership in a large multi-national
corporation is so completely dispersed throughout the globe it is
almost impossible for any individual shareholder to put together
even a significant minority interest. 60  As a result of this
geographical condition of the ownership of the corporation the
value of the individual vote of a shareholder is practically
meaningless. 61  When ownership of the corporation is
"sufficiently sub-divided," it is possible that management may
become "a self-perpetuating body" even though it has a
negligible share in the company's ownership.62 Thus, the notion
of corporate democracy is not really as much of a benefit as it
seems to be to most shareholders, and particularly to the small
investor. Indeed, in most cases it is management that controls the
modern corporation today, not the shareholder, even though he or
she is the actual owner of the enterprise. As a result, the
opportunities for meaningful participation by a shareholder are
negligible at best.63
Although the small investor is left to grasp for useless
remedies under the corporate democracy concept, not all
investors have been as unfortunate in their pursuit to hold
corporate management accountable. The relationship between
corporate management and the shareholder has been significantly
changed by the arrival of the large (if not huge) corporate
"institutional investor. " 64 The increase of trading by mutual
funds, retirement funds, and insurance companies since the early
1960s, has been significant and the pervasiveness of these funds
is beyond dispute. The largest holdings in corporate stock are
believed to be retirement funds. Moreover, their growing size
and influence has made their institutional presence increasingly
prevalent in the market. The stock holdings of institutional
investors now make up approximately one-third of all outstanding
corporate stock. This is an increase from one-quarter in 1977.65
60 Sadat-Keeling, supra note 42, at 162.
61 id.
62 Id. at 163.
63 Id.
64 Ryan, supra note 54, at 149.
65 id.
[Vol 17
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Today, the institutional investor has become the dominant voice
in the ownership of the American corporation and can, in fact,
influence the actions of major corporations. The converse of this
is that the small investor has almost disappeared as a factor,
although the individual stockholder is regularly courted by the
brokerage community.
An important observation concerning the role of the
institutional investors as the dominant shareholders of the last
quarter-century somewhat discredits observations about
management-controlled corporations: although the group in
control in a publicly owned corporation may still be able to
perpetuate themselves in control, the institutional investors,
because of the size of their holdings and because of their
sophistication as working investment professionals, can play a
significant role in corporate accountability.
In accordance with corporate democracy, stockholders
own the corporation; thus stockholders should have the right to
hold those directors accountable for actions they take while
managing the corporation. Although the size of an investor's
ownership should have no influence on his ability to hold
corporate management accountable, the corporate democracy
concept, like other democratic concepts, favors those individuals
with the biggest pocketbooks. In accordance with this general
philosophy, the small investor's tools to hold corporate
management accountable have been adversely affected by the
evolution of the market and also by legislative and regulatory
"reforms."
The accountability of corporations for their social actions
has been a problem for some time during the last century. In the
early 1960s several events, including disclosures involving the
collapse of some large corporations, suspicious payments made
on behalf of corporations by managers, and serious violations of
environmental laws that had been recently passed by Congress
helped to point out the problem of corporate social accountability.
2001 745
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The effort to hold corporations accountable for social
consequences of their actions has persisted to today. 66
Every time there is a sustained call for social
accountability, there is a reciprocal call to "get off the backs of
business. " 67 Although the philosophy of the corporate democracy
concept is that management is working on behalf of stockholders,
the law has provided stockholders with only a few ways to hold
the management of a corporation accountable, or to influence
corporate management policies - primarily derivative lawsuits
and stockholder proposals. Each of these were designed to have
some viability for the small investor, but attacks launched by
corporate management have resulted in these becoming almost
useless to the small investor.
III. THE STEADY EROSION OF THE USEFULNESS OF THE
DERIVATIVE LAWSUIT
The derivative lawsuit developed in equity "so that the
shareholder could enforce a corporate right or claim (that is one
derived from the corporation) and thereby indirectly protect the
shareholder's own interest in the corporation." 68 The need for an
equitable remedy does not arise until "those in control of the
corporation refuse to sue in the corporate name. " 69 Typically,
before equity will be invoked, a shareholder must demonstrate an
inadequate remedy at law by showing that the corporation failed
to redress the wrong that was committed against the
corporation.70  Although shareholder derivative suits are
procedurally complex, any benefit obtained as a result of the
litigation will be in favor of the corporation.7' In a derivative
66 Sadat-Keeling, supra note 42, at 165. See also Staff Report on Corporate
Accountability, Division of Corporate Finance, Securities and Exchange
Commission, presented to Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs,
U.S. Senate, 96th Cong. 20 Sess. 34-35, 143 (Sept. 4, 1980).
67 id.
68 HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 1036.
69 Id. at 1037.
10 Id.
71 id.
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suit, "the plaintiff-shareholder represents not only the corporation
on behalf of whom and on who's benefit the plaintiff-shareholder
is suing, but also the other shareholders similarly situated."
72
"It must be remembered that a [stockholder's derivative
suit] is, at present, the only civil remedy that stockholders have
for breach of fiduciary duty on the part of those entrusted with
management and direction of their corporation." 7' And, " it is
clear that the stockholder's derivative suit is an absolutely
necessary arm of equity jurisdiction and that, when used with
justice and restraint, it has both public and private value." 74
These opinions emphasize the significance of the stockholder's
derivative suit as the primary means in the American legal system
to hold accountable those entrusted with investments made by
small investors and others in corporations. Because of the
prominent position that corporations hold in almost all phases of
economic life, the value of the stockholder's derivative suit as a
way of insuring accountability to small and large investors is
almost unquestioned, except by corporate management.75
The stockholder derivative suit began to earn the disfavor
of corporate managers in the early 1930s when a phenomena
developed that was termed the "strike suit." 76 A strike suit is a
derivative action that management views as frivolous and brought
in bad faith.77 Although the corporation believes that the lawsuit
has no merit, corporate management makes the business judgment
to settle the case, because it will cost too much to defend, even
72 Id. at 1038.
73 Sergei S. Zlinkoff, The American Investor and the Constitutionality of
Section 61-B of the New York General Corporation Law, 54 YALE L. J. 352,
(1945) (quoting Judge Bernard L. Shientag from Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d
2 (N.Y. Sup. 1944).
74 See Zlinkoff, supra note 73, at 352. (citing Ralph M. Carson, Current
Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 40 MICH. L. REv 1125, 1127
(1942).
75 id.
76 Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COLUM. L.
REv. 1307 (1934).
77 Id.
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though it may be without merit. 78 , Therefore, the business
judgment is that a settlement should be entered into with the
stockholder as a means of stopping the costly litigation.
The term "strike suit" may be more descriptive than
"frivolous" because the idea is to terrify management into paying
off the litigant. 79 A single lawsuit is viewed as a maneuver in a
litigation campaign that begins with the first request for
information and ends in a negotiated compromise. It may end
before the courtroom is reached, because a plaintiffs victory in
court is unnecessary for success; where delay or publicity are
undesirable, the most non-meritorious of claims may have high
nuisance value. In addition, strike suit litigation may also involve
the filing of several separate suits, utilizing different causes of
action in several jurisdictions and using different defendants.s °
A. The Effect of the Security for Expense Statute on the
Derivative Lawsuit
The first serious legislative effort at dealing with the strike
suit while maintaining the rights of the small investor was the
infamous Section 61-b of the New York General Corporation
Law, which became effective April 9, 1944.81 Section 61-b, like
78 See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 661 (The "business judgment
rule" sustains corporate transactions and immunizes management from liability
where the transaction is within the powers of the corporation and the authority
of management, and involves the exercise of due care and compliance with
applicable fiduciary duties).
79 Note, supra note 76, at 1308.
'
0 Id. at 1308 note 1.
81 See Zlinkoff, supra note 73 at 353 (referring to N.Y. Laws 1944, c. 668).
Section 61-b of the New York General Corporation Law read as follows:
In any action instituted or maintained in the right of any
foreign or domestic corporation by the holder or holders of
less than five per centum of the outstanding shares of any class
of such corporation's stock or voting trust certificates, unless
the shares or voting trust certificates held by such holder or
holders have a market value in excess of fifty thousand dollars,
the corporation in whose right such action is brought shall be
entitled at any stage of the proceedings before final judgment
to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for the
[Vol 17
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other security for expense statutes, requires shareholders owning
less than five percent of the outstanding shares of stock to provide
the court with a certain dollar amount to cover any attorneys fees
or reasonable expenses that are incurred by the corporation in
defending the "frivolous" lawsuit. If the shareholder is not
successful in his action, the court may award the posted security
to the defendnat to pay for expenses, including reasonable
attorney's fees. 82 "It would be denying the obvious to deny that
the dire effect of the statute - if not the deliberate purpose of it -
is to bar many stockholders' actions by making them excessively
costly and difficult." 
8 3
Some twenty years after the enactment of Section 61-B, a
small study was conducted to determine the effectiveness of this
reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, which may be
incurred by it in connection with such action and by the other
parties' defendant in connection therewith ....
82 Zlinkoff, supra note 73, at 355.
83 Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 49 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 268
A.D. 352, 51 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, 294 N.Y. 1801,
61 N.E.2d 435 (1945). Instead of security for expense statutes, the Model
Business Corporations Act represents the more acceptable view of how
"frivolous" litigation might be discouraged. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §
7.46, Payment of Expenses, which provides:
On termination of the derivative proceeding the court may: (1)
order the corporation to pay the plaintiffs reasonable expenses
(including counsel fees) incurred in the proceeding if it finds
that the proceeding has resulted in a substantial benefit to the
corporation; (2) order the plaintiff to pay any defendant's
reasonable expenses (including counsel fees) incurred in
defending the proceeding if it finds that the proceeding was
commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or for an
improper purpose; or (3) order a party to pay an opposing
party's reasonable expenses (including counsel fees) incurred
because of the filing of a pleading, motion or other paper, if it
finds that the pleading, motion or other paper was not well
grounded in fact, after reasonable inquiry, or warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law and was interposed for
an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
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statute.84  The study concluded that, "[s]ecurity-for-expense
statutes are a minor factor in the prosecution of stockholders'
suits, that plaintiffs' attorneys may avoid the posting of security
with relative ease, and that there are many reasons why
defendants' attorneys decline to require posting of security, even
if circumstances permit them to do so." 85  The study also
indicated "that only the smallest minority" of all shareholders
could meet the statutory requisites of five percent or $50,000 in
order to comply with a motion for security for expenses.86
Although this study is somewhat dated, the percent of "small
investors" who can post security is still quite small.87
Strategies have been developed for avoiding security for
expense statutes.88 Creative lawyers have found several standard
ways around the security-for-expense statutes. The most
frequently used method of avoiding the security requirement is to
"plead a federal cause of action." 89 Another common method is
to bring suit in a state that does not have a security-for-expense
statute. 90 In the event neither of the two methods is acceptable,
there is the possibility that the plaintiff may move for a stay of
the proceedings, and request an order permitting inspection of the
corporation's stockholders list. 91  Corporations are at a
disadvantage when a plaintiff seeks to inspect the stockholder
lists, as the Courts have freely granted such motions.92 This
potential plaintiffs strategy is one of the main reasons why the
security for expense statutes are ineffective. This principle was
established in Baker v. MacFadden Publications, Inc. ,93 wherein
the New York Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff could seek
inspection of a corporation's list of shareholders when trying to
84 Note, supra note 12, at 50.
85 id.
86 Zlinkoff, supra note 73, at 368.
87 id.
88 J.l Case Co., 377 U.S. at 426.
89 Note, supra note 12, at 59.
90 Id. at 61 (many states do not have security-for expense statutes).
91 Id. at 62.
92Id.
93300 N.Y. 325 (1950).
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overcome the corporation's security-for-expense motion. When
shareholders know who their fellow shareholders are, they can
discuss the corporation's performance and can bind together and
become a real threat to corporate management. As a result of the
Baker decision, the purpose of the security for expense statutes
have been undermined.
Although security-for-expense statutes are fairly
ineffective, they still have a chilling effect on the small investor
who seeks to hold management accountable through a derivative
lawsuit. The idea of filing a lawsuit, and then being required to
post security to pay the opposing party's expenses acts as a
deterrent to the small investor. Another serious problem with
security-for-expense statutes is that there is no consideration of
the merits of a dispute, and therefore all shareholders lose,
particularly where there is a valid claim against management that
is thwarted because of the incapability of posting money under a
security-for-expense statute. This underlying problem results in
shareholders being deterred from utilizing derivative lawsuits as a
means of holding corporate management accountable. The basic
fact is that the "loser pays" philosophy has a chilling effect on
the small investor's willingness to take justified legal action
against corporate management. As a result, the attempt to curb
strike suits through the invention of security expense statutes has
even further discouraged legitimate small investor derivative
lawsuits.
B. The Effect of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 on the
Derivative Lawsuit
The security-for-expense statutes were first enacted in
1944 in New York, as a means of curbing "frivolous" strike
suits. 94 Although this was the first attempt to curb strike suits,
the bar had always appreciated the problem of abuse of the legal
system with so-called "frivolous" litigation. Prior to the
enactment of security-for-expense statutes, the Federal Rules of
"Note, supra note 11, at 59.
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Civil Procedure attempted to limit frivolous lawsuits through the
1938 version of Rule 11.
95
The goal of Rule 11 was to insure accuracy and integrity
in pleadings filed in Federal Court.96 In its original form, Rule
11 had requirements for certification of pleadings .9 The attorney
had to swear to the existence of a reasonably adequate basis in
facts to support a claim. 98 "Good faith was the standard used to
determine whether the rule had been violated: The signature of
any attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief there is good ground to support it ... "99 A serious
problem with the original version of Rule 11 was that there were
no sanctions for a violation.'°° For a court to consider sanctions
of any kind, there had to be a finding of bad faith by the attorney
filing the pleadings.10 And, as usual, the judge had discretion
with respect to sanctions "even when an attorney had willfully
violated the rule." Although the rule established a number of
requirements that attorneys were required to comply with, the
rule was almost never used by the courts as a means of imposing
disciplinary actions upon attorneys. From "1950 to 1976 only
nineteen Rule 11 motions were reported." 102
In 1983, Rule 11 was amended with the goal of providing
some clarification as to the provisions regarding sanctioning. 103
The sanctioning provisions were changed so that sanctions were
required when the court actually made a finding that there had
95 See Karen K. Cain, Comment, Frivolous Litigation, Discretionary
Sanctioning and a Safe Harbor: The 1993 revision of Rule 11, 43 KAN. L.
REv. 207, 208 (1994).
96 Id. at 207.
97 Id. at 209.
98 Id.
99 Id.
1oo Id.10' Cain, supra note 95.
102 See D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some
"Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 Minn. L.
Rev. 1, 34-37 (1976).
103 FED. R. Civ. P. 11
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been a violation of Rule 11.104 The amendments did not confront
the issue of the types of sanctions that should or could be
imposed, which was probably a major flaw in the revised rule.'
As a result, a court had absolute discretion to arbitrarily impose
any "appropriate sanction" based on a particular set of facts.
10 6
By 1990, however, after some experience with the new rule and
its lack of direction, the Tenth Circuit, in White v. General
Motors Corp.,107 arrived at several factors that a court should
consider when determining the value of a monetary sanction.
Among the factors the court stated should be considered were:
whether the attorney had the ability to pay the sanction; whether
the amount requested was reasonable under the circumstances;
whether the amount was large enough to deter future conduct;
and whether there was a history of Rule 11 violations.
0 8
The Advisory Committee said that the purpose of the 1983
Rule was to provide a deterrence to over-zealous and abusive
litigation. 10 9 Enforcement of the 1983 Rule was quite consistent
with the principle purposes of creating the rule: (1) punishing any
party who offended the rule; (2) deterring attorneys from any
future unprofessional or abusive conduct; and (3) compensating
injured parties who suffered at the hands of the abuser. 10 The
judicial system's consistency in enforcing the underlying purpose
of Rule 11 was supported by the fact that attorneys fees were
imposed in over ninety percent of the cases where Rule 11
motions were successful."' The judiciary's increased utilization
of Rule 11 increased attorneys interest in filing Rule 11 motions
as a means of shifting the costs of attorneys fees to their
adversaries. 112
104 Id.
'0' Cain, supra note 95, at 211.
106 id.
107 908 F.2d. 675 (10th Cir. 1990).
08 [d; see also Cain, supra note 95, at 211.
109 See Cain, supra note 95 at 214.
I d.
111 Id.
112 id.
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The 1993 Rule seems much clearer than prior versions.
The 1993 Rule is composed of four subsections: (a) a signature
requirement; (b) certification by the attorney as to the legitimacy
of the claim; (c) sanctions guidelines; and (d) the limitation that
the rule shall not apply to discovery." 3 The significant changes
to the Rule, which impacted both interpretation and application,
are found in subdivisions (b), which deals with representations to
the court, and (c), which deals with sanctions. 114 The 1993
revisions are much more direct and clear than its predecessors.
115
However, its potential for sanctions still may act as a deterrent to
the small investor who would like to hold corporate management
accountable.
The small investor has two major impediments to his
ability to hold corporate management accountable through a
derivative lawsuit; security-for-expense statutes and federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11. Considering the financial weakness of
small investors, these can present insurmountable obstacles to
what might be a legitimate claim of fraud or illegal behavior by
corporate management. Of the two, the most unacceptable and
draconian is the security-for-expense statute. Rule 11 at least
allows for some judicial judgment as to the merits of the proposed
litigation.
IV. STOCKHOLDER PROPOSALS
Although the small investor's right to hold corporate
management accountable through derivative lawsuits has been
affected by security-for-expense statutes and the implementation
of Rule 11, the small investor still has the right to hold corporate
management accountable through stockholder proposals. The
stockholder proposal rule, otherwise known as Rule 14a-8,116 is
the only other significant way that a small investor may be able to
influence management. Pursuant to Rule 14a-8, "qualifying"
... FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
114 id.
115 Cain, supra note 95, at 216.
11617 C.F.R. 240.14a-8.
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shareholders are entitled to include proposals in management's
proxy solicitation materials if the subject qualifies as a "proper
subject" for action by shareholders.1 17 Rule 14a-8 was designed
to allow the shareholder to participate in corporate decision-
making processes, including those decisions involving matters of
public interest and corporate accountability. If management
opposes the proposal, which it unfailingly does, the shareholder
can include a statement of 100 words supporting his proposal.
118
There are two issues that SEC Rule 14a-8 has historically
highlighted: 1) the need to "hold management of large
corporations accountable for their actions which affect society";
and 2) the shareholder's proper role "within the system of
corporate governance." 119 The shareholder proposal rule has
been used as a tool by shareholders to introduce proposals "on
matters of public policy" to management. 1
20
The first amendments that were adopted to restrict the
shareholder's access to the proxy machinery were adopted in
1948. These amendments were meant to "respond to alleged
abuses by a few shareholders of the 'privilege' of having their
proposals included in management's proxy statement." 121 These
amendments permitted "the exclusion of shareholder proposals
that were, in fact, proper subjects for action by shareholders." 122
By 1970, amendments had been adopted by the Commission that
"permittted management to exclude proposals on many grounds
relating either to a proposal's subject matter or to the procedure
followed by its proponent." 123 Perhaps the real purpose, and
certainly the effect of the change, was to prevent communication
and organization in support of a proposal. 124  Consider that
between 1944 and 1971, not one shareholder proposal was able to
117 id.
11 Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal
Rule, 18 GA. L. REv. 425, 428 (1984).
19 Sadat-Keeling, supra note 42, at 164.
12 Id.
1 Id. at 168.
1221d .
123 id.
124 Id. at note 39.
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muster judicial support for its inclusion. 25 By the late 1960s and
1970s, there was an increase in shareholder proposals, 126 but the
law clearly disfavored their proponents.
In 1976, the Commission solicited and received comments
on the question of whether eligibility requirements should be
imposed upon prospective proponents of proposals. At the time,
the SEC concluded that there was "little support" for the
imposition of eligibility requirements, finding no evidence that
there was abuse or that such requirements would either reduce the
number of proposals submitted, or exclude those that were
offered in bad faith. 1
27
However, in 1982, the SEC found abuse and reversed its
previous position. 28 The SEC concluded that abuse of the rule
125 Cases during this period rejecting the inclusion of proposals include Peck
v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (plaintiff
shareholder/proponent denied a preliminary injunction which would have
enjoined defendant issuer from soliciting proxies unless it included a proposal
recommending that management consider the advisability of abolishing the
segregated seating system in the South); Dyer v. SEC, 289 F.2d 242 (8th Cir.
1961) (court refused to require inclusion of petitioner's proposal that each
director should be disqualified for re-election and censured at a meeting at
which proponents were candidates); Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 108 F. Supp.
810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (proposal that issuer continue and intensify its
exploration and development of offshore petroleum reserves and encourage
creation of a stable international regime having jurisdiction over such resources
held excludable as an improper subject for security holder action).
126 The Commission's annual reports show an increase from 156 proposals in
1966, 32 Sec. Ann. Rep. 52 (1966), to 293 proposals in 1970, and to 370
proposals in 1975, 41 SEC. Ann. Rep. 51 (1975).
127 See SEC Staff Report on Corporate Accountability, Division of Corporate
Finance, Securities Exchange Commission, presented to Committee on
Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 96th Cong. 20 Sess. 34-35,
143 (Sept. 4, 1980).
128 Sadat-Keeling, supra note 42, at 176. "397 Letters were received from
383 commentators: 97 issuers, 7 law firms, 20 bar associations, 31 trade
associations and unions, 2 securities industry organizations, 97 religious
investors, 19 institutional investors, 104 individual investors and 6 legislators.
Securities & Exchange Commission, Division of Corporate Finance, Summary
of Comments, Shareholder Proposal Proposed Amendments Release
10... The commission received comments from 207 commentators, 142 of
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would be curtailed by "requiring shareholders who put the
company and other shareholders to the expense of including a
proposal... to have some measured economic stake or
investment interest in the corporation." 129 Accordingly, in 1983
the SEC again amended 14a-8 and required a shareholder
proposal proponent to hold voting securities of at least one
percent of the respective class of shares, or $1,000 in market
value.' 30  A proponent must have also owned his stocks for at
least one year at the time the proposal is submitted. 3 1  This
amendment seems to be aimed squarely at the small investor, and
it does not take into consideration those investors abusing the
proxy machinery and investors having a legitimate interest in
making proposals to management. One percent is absurdly high
when dealing with registered companies, considering the fact that
nearly one-third of all stockholders have portfolios of less than
$5,000.132
So at the end of a long line of attacks on 'abuses' of one
kind or another, the small investor ends up confronted with
security-for-expense statutes, Rule 11, and the imposition of
minimum investment and holding requirements that must be met
in order to make a proposal to the management of the corporation
in which he or she is part owner. Although it seemed that these
rules were enough barriers for the small investor, the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995133 has further limited
the small investor's right to hold corporate management
accountable.
whom supported the minimum investment requirement, the minimum holding
period requirement, or both."
129 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 20091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38, 218 (1983)
(released Aug. 16, 1983).
130 Sadat-Keeling, supra note 42, at 176. Pursuant to the rule proponents
may aggregate their holding to meet the minimum investment requirements.
,131 Id. at 176.
132 See supra note 3.
133 Pub. L. No. 104-67, see supra note 1.
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V. THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF
1995
An interesting thing about the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) is that it may well be founded on a
false premise. That premise is that there is an explosion of
"frivolous" lawsuits being filed and it is costing some
corporations and accountants a great deal of money. 34 The
Securities and Exchange Commission, however, has denied the
existence of any recent litigation "explosion" with respect to
securities fraud suits. 135
The question of whether or not the number of frivolous
class actions involving securities fraud has grown substantially
over time remains a matter of significant dispute. 136  Some
empirical studies have suggested settlements in securities fraud
cases may be largely determined by defendant's insurance, rather
than by an analysis of the merits of the plaintiffs claims. 37
In spite of the fact that the empirical evidence on the so-
called 'litigation explosion' is suspect, many argue that the
reform of the private securities fraud cause of action is justified
solely due to the perception of a looming crisis. 138  What is
interesting is the absence of any discussion of the substantial
134 See, e.g., Jill N. Willis, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: Friend or Foe of the Investor?, 47 FLA. L. REv. 841, 842 (1995).
'35 See Edward Felsenthal, Stadium-site Dispute Raises Ethics Issue, WALL
ST. J., June 18, 1993, at B4 (The number of securities cases in federal courts
has not increased over the past two decades, and the increase in securities class
action suits in the prior three years, while significant, does not constitute an
'explosion.").
136 Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(B) and the Vagaries of Federal Common
Law: The Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a
Structuralist Approach, U. ILL. L. REv. 71, 76 (1997).
137 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of
Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497; William T.
Carleton, et. al., Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Descriptive Study, 38
ARiz. L. REv. 491 (1996).
138 See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: the Long and Winding
Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW.
335, 340 (1938).
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number of lawsuits that are settled because they are in fact
meritorious. It seems that one of the ways one might keep fraud
from being discovered is to settle any lawsuit that threatens to
expose it. While it may be true that settling a non-meritorious
lawsuit saves the company money, it may also prevent the
discovery of fraud. To say that a drop in the price of stock is a
sufficient reason to test whether or not there is fraud begs the
question: What indicators does one look for in determining
whether there is fraud in the management of a corporation when
great efforts are made to keep it hidden if it exists? All the
company has to do is provide a full and accurate description of
what is happening in the company.
If the lawsuits are indeed frivolous, fighting them may
very well be a better way of handling them than to cut the ability
of the small investor to honestly question management. In new
and technology driven companies, the only real indicators of what
is going on are product announcements and stock prices. When
there is a question about either of these in the minds of the small
investor, he should have a right to sue.
It has been observed that:
[t]he major reason for reforming the securities
litigation system, however, is one of perception:
no matter what the degree of actual dysfunction,
many economic actors plainly believe that the
system is harmful and counterproductive because
of its invitation to frivolous or unnecessary
litigation. The perception that we have a fair,
controlled system is crucial. I have no doubt that
fear of dysfunctional litigation is adversely
affecting capital marketplace decisions: whether
companies go public, whether foreign companies
seek listings on our stock exchanges and
NASDAQ, whether voluntary disclosure occurs
(and in what form). Moreover, the same fear has
produced an unfortunate judicial backlash, eroding
otherwise salutary doctrinal standards, evidenced
2001 759
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most recently by the Supreme Court's Central
Bank decision.' 
39
The SEC should do more to get the facts out about
securities litigation rather than fix the system to respond to an
inaccurate perception at the expense of corporate democracy and
the small investor. All of the arguments of the proponents of the
"litigation explosion" theory were challenged by Professor Joel
Seligman in 1994, with an article based on the thesis that, "[w]ith
limited exceptions, there is yet insufficient evidence to justify
significant rule or legislative changes that would further burden
private federal securities litigation. While there may be a few
peripheral questions that deserve further investigation, the basic
case for new legislation restricting private rights of action has not
been made." 40  He lays down the argument that securities
litigation has gotten out of hand and is destroying the very capital
formation policy it seeks to promote and then explains how
securities registration filings had steadily increased from 500
billion dollars to 868 billion dollars from 1991 to 1993.141 He
also counters the argument that an explosion in litigation results
because companies "are sued whenever their stock drops," with
data showing only 123.5 consolidated cases filed per year
compared to 17,400 companies that file annually with the SEC. 
42
Professor Seligman's comments were not well received as
the Republican Congress drove through the PSLRA over then
President Clinton's veto in an effort to fulfill its 'Contract with
America.'
"9 Id. at 340.
140 Joel Seligman, Merits do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfaest's
"Disimplying Private Rights Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Commission's Authority", 108 HARv. L. REv. 438 (1994) (In this article
Professor Seligman states the fundamental arguments for the proponents of a
change in the securities laws to contain the litigation explosion, and then
destroys them.).
141 Id at 439.
142 Id. at 442.
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A. Stricter Pleading Requirements Under the Act
To date, the PSLRA's stricter pleading requirements are
the most litigated section of the Reform Act. There have been
many cases that deal with the issue of clarifying the new pleading
standards and whether or not the pleadings have met those
standards. 143  The Act makes the standards for pleading
significantly more specific for complaints filed pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act by requiring plaintiff to plead as to the
defendant's state of mind. The purpose of the Act is to "establish
uniform and more stringent pleading requirements to curtail the
filing of meritless lawsuits." 144 Because liability is conditioned
upon the defendant acting with a particular state of mind, the
complaint must contain specific facts that give rise to a "strong
inference" that the defendant possessed the requisite mental
state; 145 a pleading standard that is difficult to meet in cases of
fraud.
The increased pleading standards further require that the
plaintiff plead and prove proximate causation as an element of the
claim. These two increased pleading standard requirements,
combined with the small investor's- limited resources for
investigation limit, even further, the small investor's right to hold
corporate management accountable.
B. Reforming Class Action Lawsuits Under the Act
The second way that the PSLRA of 1995 has limited the
rights of the small investor is through the PSLRA's reforms
relating to class action lawsuits. As a means of curbing the
ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to serve as the person initiating a
141 See, e.g., Williams v. WMX Technologies, Inc., 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir.
1997); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation, 970 F. Supp. 746
(N.D. Cal. 1997); In re Baesa Securities Litigation v. Buenos Aires
Embotelladora, 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Krear v. Malek, 961 F.
Supp. 1065 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal
Pharmaceutical Corporation, 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
144 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 740.
14s 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
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class action lawsuit, the PSLRA placed limitations on who could
act as the class representative. The Act requires plaintiffs, who
want to serve as class representatives, file sworn statements that
they have reviewed the complaints, did not purchase stock at the
direction of counsel as a means of qualifying as class
representative, and do not intend to accept any payment for
serving as class representatives. 146 The Act's provisions further
provide that a court should presume the plaintiff with the "largest
financial stake in the relief sought" 147 is the most appropriate lead
plaintiff of the class. 14
8
The presumption that the individual with the "largest
financial stake in the relief sought" is the most appropriate lead
plaintiff is fatally flawed. The assumption is the lead plaintiff
will be an institutional investor, because in today's securities
exchange market, an institutional investor will likely be the entity
with the largest financial stake in the relief sought. 149  The
146 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)).
147 In M. Greebel et al. v. FTP Software, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 57 (1996). The
plaintiff brought an action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated,
and then moved to be appointed lead plaintiff. In granting the motion, the
court stated:
In making this determination, the statute erects a rebuttable
presumption that the most capable plaintiff is the person with
the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class,
and 'otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' The presumption may be
rebutted only 'upon proof by a member of the purported
plaintiff class that the presumptively most capable plaintiff
'will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class' or is 'subject to unique defenses.'
Id. at 58 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)).
148 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3).
149 Scholars predict that increasing the role of institutional investors will
benefit both injured shareholders and courts:
Institutions with large stakes in class actions have much the
same interests as the plaintiff class generally; thus, courts
could be more confident settlements negotiated under the
supervision of institutional plaintiffs were 'fair and
reasonable' than is the case with settlements negotiated by
unsupervised plaintiffs' attorneys.
Greebel, 939 F. Supp. at 64.
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problem with this presumption is that most institutional investors
are "fiduciaries" that are responsible for managing other people's
money. As such, they have an obligation to maximize profits on
all investments in which they participate. As a result of this
fiduciary relationship, it appears that an institutional investor,
who serves as a fiduciary and is appointed lead plaintiff, may find
himself or herself faced with a conflict of interest. The conflict is
as follows.
Assume an institutional investor (pension fund A) holds a
substantial amount of stock in company ABC. ABC is sued for
violating Rule lOb-5 for fraud. Assuming the PSLRA's stricter
pleading standards are met, and there is a "strong inference" that
some fraud has occurred, the institutional investor must, under
his fiduciary duty to his investors, consider whether to hold or
sell its stock in ABC. If discovery procedures uncover serious
fraud, the institutional investor most likely has a duty to unload
all, or substantially all, of his stock in ABC. This runs full circle
back to a plaintiff with a relatively small investment in ABC. If
the institutional investor does not dispose of ABC, the
institutional investor may face problems when responding to
inquiries about why he or she held onto stock in a company
where fraud had occurred. This results in the investor losing
money due to plummeting stock prices. There does not appear to
be an acceptable answer to this problem.
A better approach would require the lead plainitiff have a
minimum investment. The minimum investment will lessen the
above-mentioned conflict, and also'enable the small investor to
preserve his rights.
C. Delaying Discovery and Proportionate Liability Under
the Act
In addition to "reforming" the pleading and class action
procedures, the Act has also attempted to reform discovery in
private securities litigation cases. The Act has provisions
requiring that discovery be delayed until the defendant has the
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opportunity to file a motion to dismiss, which can postpone the
running of litigation costs to the corporate defendant. 150
The Act also institutes a new scheme of proportionate
liability, where a defendant may be held liable only for that
portion of the judgment that he is responsible for. "In many
cases, this amounts to a reduced recovery for innocent investors
and small investors." ' 15 1 The Act's proportionate liability rule
applies whether the defendant has been found liable for
unintentional (i.e., reckless) violation of the Securities Exchange
Act, and neither of the following scenarios exist: (a) the plaintiff
has a net worth of less than $200,000 and is entitled to damages
in excess of ten percent of his net worth, or (b) a co-defendant is
insolvent and cannot pay his share of damages. 152
D. Strengthening Rule 11 Under the Act
Additionally, the PSLRA limits the rights of the small
investor by making Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure much stronger in its application to private securities
actions. The Act specifically requires a court enter findings
relating to an attorney's compliance with his or her obligations
under Rule 11.153 Where the court determines that Rule 11 has
been violated, the imposition of sanctions is mandatory. There is
a rebuttable presumption that sanctions will take the form of
attorneys' fees and Costs. 154 In a class action, the court has the
authority to require an undertaking from the attorney for the class
to provide for the payment of fees and expenses ultimately
awarded under Rule 11.155 Once again, this provision further
deters the small investor from holding corporate management
accountable.
0 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 736 (1995).
151 See Alan S. Ritchie, The Proposed "Securities Private Enforcement
Reform Act": The Introduction of Proportionate Liability into Rule 10b-5
Litigation, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 339 (1994).
152 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(0.
153 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1).
154 Id.
1' 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(8).
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E. New Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Information
Another significant reform coming from the PSLRA is the
creation of a safe harbor for the disclosure of forward-looking
information. 156  Congress' concern that frivolous litigation has
discouraged corporate management from disclosing internal
projections and similar forecasts was the impetus for creating the
new safe harbor provision. 157
Any public statement that satisfies the requirements for the
safe harbor cannot be the basis for private liability if either of two
tests is satisfied. First, no private liability may be imposed for
forward-looking statements made without actual knowledge that
the statements were false or misleading.' 58 Rule 3b-6 states that
forward-looking statements in documents filed with the SEC shall
not be deemed fraudulent unless made without a reasonable basis
or in bad faith. 159
Second, no private liability is possible if the forward-
looking statement is identified as such when made and is
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language identifying
significant factors that might prevent the statement from
156 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5. Securities Act Release No. 7101, 59 Fed. Reg.
52,723 (Oct. 19, 1994) provides:
The term 'forward-looking statement' is defined in current
Rule 175 as limited to the following: (1) A statement
containing a projection of revenues, income (loss), earnings
(loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital
structure or other financial items; (2) A statement of
management's plans and objectives for future operations; (3) A
statement of future economic performance contained in
management's discussion and analysis of financial condition
and results of operations included pursuant to Item 303 of
Regulation S-K or Item 9 of Form 20-F; or (4) Disclosed
statements of the assumptions underlying or relating to any of
the statements described in (1), (2), or (3) above. 17 C.F.R.
230.175.
"17 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 741-42 (1995).
1s Id.
"9 17 C.F.R. § 240-3b-6 (1995).
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becoming accurate. 160 The "bespeaks caution" doctrine holds that
forward-looking statements are not actionable if accompanied by
cautionary language because (a) such statements may be
immaterial as a matter of law, and (b) plaintiffs are not entitled to
justifiably rely upon such statements. 161
This safe harbor provision is unfavorable to both the
small and large investors. The management can be protected
even though misleading statements are released as long as the
statements are based on past financial performance or estimated
future performance. Whether it is reasonable or wishful thinking
is almost impossible to determine, and it is focused on having the
ability to accurately predict the future. "The [Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act] which has gone too far ... have changed
the safe harbor provisions to the point where actual lying is
permitted .. 162
VI. CONCLUSION
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act has serious
unintended consequences. When Congress is pressured by a
group of lobbyist to enact this type of legislation, which is
beneficial only to the group represented by the lobbyist, the
consequences are evident to the group adversely affected.
However, the group of "small investors" continue to have the
availability of the unsatisfactory "Wall Street" rule for their
ultimate protection.
Perhaps corporations should not have the ability to quickly
settle what they consider frivolous lawsuits. Corporations and
plaintiffs should be held accountable for their actions. Eventually
lawyers and their clients, who abuse the legal process, will
understand it is not advantageous to pursue frivolous litigation.
This scenario will resemble other investments where the return
will be realized within a few years with a significant decrease in
"frivolous litigation." In addition, stockholders should
160id.
16 1 Avery, supra note 138, at 344.
162 141 Cong. Rec. H15214-06, H15217.
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understand this position benefits the long-term interest of the
company. Fraud and misrepresentation are present in the market
place, and the ability of a "small investor" to act as a private
attorney general should not be limited, particularly in view of the
financial constraints that can be imposed on the Justice
Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
Federal Trade Commission.
The "small investor" has an informational disadvantage in
terms of detecting fraud and misrepresentation, and is severely
limited in his ability to get information that is not published by
corporate management. This statute promotes as well as permits
misrepresentation and fraud, which may be less likely to be
discovered. It will be virtually impossible to determine whether
there is a factual basis for any forward-looking statement.
Furthermore, the pleading requirements will prevent the
meritorious and the non-meritorious cases.
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